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TOWARD A THEORY OF SHAREHOLDER LEVERAGE
Lisa M. Fairfax

Over the past several years increased shareholder activism has triggered
significant corporate governance changes aimed at enhancing shareholders’
power over director elections and corporate affairs. These changes threaten
both the director primacy theory and the team production theory of corporate
governance by undermining directors’ broad discretion to make decisions on
behalf of the corporation and all of its constituents. But such changes have not
resulted in a regime of shareholder primacy. Rather they can be better
understood as a regime of shareholder leverage. Despite the increased power at
their disposal, in most circumstances, the shareholders remain content to defer
to directors. When they are not content, directors retain the freedom to ignore
and even circumvent shareholders’ will, blunting the force of increased
shareholder power. The theory of shareholder leverage therefore contends that
while the current governance regime paves the way for shareholders to exercise
greater influence over director decision-making, directors still appropriately
remain the primary power source in the modern public corporation.
A significant number of corporate governance changes have occurred in
the past few years, particularly surrounding executive compensation and director
elections. Indeed, public company shareholders now have a say on pay—an
advisory vote on the compensation packages of the top executives. 1
Additionally, director election processes have been radically altered. By the
beginning of 2014, 91 percent of S&P 500 companies had declassified their
boards—up from 40 percent a decade ago 2—and almost 90 percent of S&P 500
companies had adopted some form of majority voting whereby directors must
either receive a majority shareholder vote or resign upon failure to receive
majority shareholder support. 3 In 2006, only 16 percent of S&P 500 companies
had implemented such standards. 4 Moreover, while the D.C. Circuit
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012).
SPENCERSTUART, SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 2013, at 4, 12 (2013), available at
https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/PDF%20Files/Research%20and%20Insight%20PDFs/S
SBI13%20revised%2023DEC2013.pdf.
Marc S. Gerber, US Corporate Governance: Boards of Directors Face Increased Scrutiny, SKADDEN
(Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.skadden.com/insights/us-corporate-governance-boards-directorsface-increased-scrutiny; see also SPENCERSTUART, supra note 77, at 13 (noting that 84 percent of
boards have polices requiring directors who fail to secure majority vote to offer their resignation,
up form 56 percent in 2008).
See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, NEAL, GERGER & EISENBERG LLP, STUDY OF MAJORITY
VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELECTIONS 1 (2007), available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/uploads/
documents/majoritystudy111207.pdf. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act also eliminated broker
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overturned the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) mandated proxy
access rule which would have required that corporations enable certain
shareholders to nominate candidates of their choice on the corporation’s proxy
statement, 5 beginning in 2012 shareholders have been allowed to submit
shareholder proposals seeking to adopt procedures for proxy access. 6 These
changes collectively pave the way towards greater shareholder influence over
corporate affairs.
Such changes also appear to breathe new life into the shareholder primacy
theory while undermining both the director primacy and team production
theory of corporate governance. Enhanced shareholder power certainly runs
counter to the broad director discretion envisioned by director primacy. It not
only limits director decision-making in connection with management and their
pay policies but also constrains directors’ freedom to make business decisions
that may be disfavored by shareholders. Increased shareholder power also
increases the probability that directors will focus exclusively on shareholders
rather than balancing the competing concerns of all corporate constituents as
envisioned by the team production model.
But evidence reveals that with respect to compensation and election
matters, shareholders are largely content not to exercise their increased powers.
Thus, the vast majority of directors continue to get elected at high rates. 7 In the
last election cycle, only 61 director nominees received less than majority
support. 8 Similarly, shareholders overwhelmingly approve the vast majority of
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discretionary voting in uncontested director elections, a change which was viewed as significant
because studies suggested that when brokers cast uninstructed votes, those votes tended to favor
management. See § 78f(b)(10)(A-B); see generally Melissa Aguilar, Reminder: Broker Votes Out for
Say On Pay, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.complianceweek.com/reminderbroker-votes-out-for-say-on-pay/article/187418 (“Since brokers historically tended to cast those
votes in favor of management, observers say the change could make it tougher for some companies
to win shareholder approval of management say-on-pay resolutions, which will become
mandatory under the law.”). Elimination of such votes was therefore presumed to enhance
shareholder voting power. Knute J. Salhus & Jeffries L. Oliver-Li, SEC Approves Elimination of
Broker Discretionary Voting in Uncontested Elections of Directors, WILMERHALE (July 2, 2009),
http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=93237.
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1147, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9259; 3465343, 75 Fed. Reg. 56668-01 (Sept. 16, 2011); see also INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER
SERVICES, 2013 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 31 (2013), available at http://www.issgove
rnance.com/files/private/ 2013ISSUnitedStatesPostseasonReport.pdf.
See id. at 33.
James B. Stewart, Bad Directors and Why They Aren’t Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/30/business/why-bad-directors-arent-thrown-out.html. One
study found that “only 8 percent of the directors who received majority withheld votes at
companies with plurality plus” regimes stepped down after the vote, and “only half of directors
at companies with majority standards did so.” See IRCC INST., GMIRATINGS, THE
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pay packages, with the result that less than 2 percent of company pay packages
get rejected. 9 Then too, when shareholders exercise their power, directors are
able to thwart that exercise. There are several highly publicized examples of
shareholders repeatedly rejecting pay packages that corporations do not alter. 10
This is because some corporations have opted to ignore the advisory say on pay
vote. Evidence also reveals that most directors who fail to receive a majority of
the shareholder vote remain on the board. Of the 61 directors who failed to
receive majority vote in 2013, 51 remained on the board at the start of the 2014
proxy season, resulting in what some have called “zombie directors.” 11 This is
because the board has discretion to refuse to accept directors’ resignations or
otherwise retain directors, when they fail to get a majority vote. 12 This means
that directors have considerable discretion to make decisions that are at odds
with shareholder preferences.
To be sure, despite this discretion shareholders do enjoy significantly more
sway over director decision-making. Empirical evidence confirms that directors
have increased their engagement with shareholders, enhanced their disclosures
in an effort to prevent any shareholder discontent, and altered their policies on
compensation as well as director recruitment and retention. 13 These actions
suggest that while the board continues to have considerable discretion in the
current corporate governance regime, shareholders have increased leverage. The
critical question then becomes whether a shareholder leverage model of
corporate governance can provide a more appropriate balance between board
discretion and accountability.
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ELECTION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN SHAREOWNERS
WITHHOLD A MAJORITY OF VOTES FROM DIRECTOR NOMINEES? 2 (2012), available at
http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/Final%20Election%20of%20Directors%20GMI%20Aug%202012.pd.
See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 6, at 6.
See id.
See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 8.
See generally id. (“[T]he reality is that H.P. can do whatever it wants, regardless of what the
shareholders say.”).
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